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I. INTRODUCTION 
This marks the second appeal of this case to the Idaho Supreme Court. As with the first 
appeal, the Appellants allege that the lower-court judge abused his discretion when ruling on 
various evidentiary questions. The Appellants also further allege that there was a lack of 
"substantial, competent evidence" to support the jury's verdict. It is interesting to note that the 
Appellants spend sixteen (16) pages of their Appellants' Brief detailing the evidence presented 
at trial. Unfortunately for the Appellants, the Idaho Supreme Court is not the appropriate place 
to try ( or re-try) their case. Rather, this case was appropriately tried before a jury, at the district 
court level. 
Throughout the trial, the Honorable Randy Stoker was often called on to exercise his 
discretion and rule on certain evidentiary issues. As concerns those rulings now challenged by 
the Appellants, the transcript shows that Judge Stoker considered all relevant factors prior to 
making his decisions, and therefore, did not abuse his discretion. Furthermore, even if Judge 
Stoker committed error by allowing the evidence that the Appellants now challenge, other 
evidence in the case, particularly the testimony of the Respondent, provided the jury with a 
sufficient basis to support their verdict. Therefore, this Court should grant Judge Stoker and the 
jury the deference due them, and uphold the verdict in this case. 
II. ST A TEMENT OF THE CASE 
This case was originally tried before a jury on October 22 through 26, 2007. That trial 
resulted in a verdict for the plaintiffs. However, the Appellants successfully appealed that case. 
See, Hurtado v. Land O'Lakes, Inc., 147 Idaho 813 (Idaho 2009). The latest trial commenced 
on October 19, 2010. 
The crux of the Respondent's case was as follows: During the summer of 2005, the 
Respondent fed Land O'Lakes (LOL) milk replacer to his heifer calves, but not to his bull 
calves, which instead received "government" replacer. The heifer calves experienced a greater 
Respondents' Brief-4-
level scours (diarrhea) and resultant death than in a normal year. After being unable to 
determine the exact cause of the scours, in late summer 2005, Mr. Hurtado began to feed 
government replacer to the heifers. Shortly thereafter, the rate of scours and death dropped to 
normal levels. Additionally, the Respondent had Mr. Brudevold, a professional ruminant 
nutritionist and dairyman himself, testify that, in his expert opinion, the Respondent's scours 
were "nutritional" scours (caused by feed), and further testify to the fact that his own calves also 
experienced scours at about the same time as Mr. Hurtado when feeding the LOL replacer. 
Furthermore, Mr. Hurtado testified to his belief as to the market value of a single calf, and as to 
his memory of the number of calves, above normal levels, that died while he was feeding the 
LOL replacer. 
The Appellants' defense can be summarized as follows: In order to convince the jury 
that it was unlikely that the replacer was defective, fact witnesses testified to the quality-control 
measures that Land O'Lakes follows. Mr. Riesberg, a chemist, also testified that three of the 
four lots that Mr. Hurtado's replacer might possibly have come from were tested, and 
considered, in his expert opinion, to be safe for consumption. A veterinarian for the Appellants 
testified to his belief of the market value of a heifer calf. Additionally, the Appellants also 
questioned workers from the J and J Calf Ranch, eliciting from them estimates of calf deaths 
that were different (greater) than what Mr. Hurtado testified to. 
During the course of Mr. Brudevold's expert opinion and factual testimony, the 
Appellants objected time and time again. The basis of these objections was a lack of foundation 
to support Mr. Brudevold's opinions and fact testimony. Judge Stoker, after consideration of 
arguments on the objections, continued to uphold these objections until he was satisfied that the 
Respondent had elicited answers from Mr. Brudevold to adequately lay the necessary 
foundation for his expert opinions and fact testimony. 
After hearing the substantial, although conflicting, evidence from both sides, the jury 
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determined that the LOL replacer was defective, and awarded damages in the amount of 
$50,000.00. The Appellants now appeal this verdict, arguing that the Respondent did not meet 
his burden of proof to exclude reasonable alternative causes for the heifer calf deaths; 
challenging the jury's determination by arguing that substantial and competent evidence was 
not presented to support the jury's verdict; and challenging Judge Stoker's discretion in 
determining that adequate foundational testimony was eventually elicited to allow Mr. 
Brudevold's expert opinions and factual testimony. 
III. ISSUES ON APPEAL 
A) Did the Respondent meet its burden of proof to exclude alternative reasonable causes 
for the heifer deaths? 
B) Is the jury's verdict supported by substantial and competent evidence? 
-1) As to the issue of breach of the implied warranty of merchantability/product 
defect? 
-2) As to the amount of damages? 
C) Did the lower court correctly rule that Mr. Brudevold could testify concerning 
defects in the milk replacer? 
D) Did the lower court correctly rule that Mr. Brudevold could testify concerning 
similar problems with the milk replacer on his own ranch? 
IV. ARGUMENT 
A) THE RESPONDENT MET ITS BURDEN OF PROOF TO EXCLUDE ALTERNATIVE 
REASONABLE CA USES FOR THE HEIFER DEATHS 
Appellants contend that the Respondent was required, as a matter of law, to put on 
evidence of "proper" scientific testing to exclude possible causes for the scours other than the 
LOL replacer. The Respondent does not dispute the Appellants' contention of law that, when a 
claim of product liability is based on circumstantial evidence, as it was here, the plaintiff has the 
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burden to put on evidence to exclude other "reasonably likely" causes. Farmer v. International 
Harvester Co., 97 Idaho 742, 749 (1976). However, the Respondent does dispute the 
Appellants' claim that the Respondent's evidence did not meet this burden. 
To rule out causes other than the LOL replacer, the Respondent put on the testimony of 
Mr. Hurtado. Mr. Hurtado testified that while he was using the LOL replacer, the rate of scours 
and death among his heifer calves was well above normal levels. Tr. I 46-4 7. Mr. Hurtado 
further testified to only changing the milk replacer from LOL to government replacer, and then 
the death rate dropped off to normal. Tr. I 53-54. 
Such action by Mr. Hurtado is equivalent to the most conclusive of scientific 
experiments. Feeding the calves with the LOL versus without the LOL can be considered two 
"tests." Feeding with the LOL can be considered the "control." Feeding without the LOL can 
be considered the "experiment." Therefore, the LOL replacer is the solo "variable." When all 
things are constant between a control test and an experiment test except for a single variable, 
then one can be assured that any difference in result between the two tests is caused solely by 
the variable. Therefore, Mr. Hurtado's actions, in changing the milk replacer and nothing else, 
constitute a "proper" scientific experiment showing that the LOL replacer alone was the cause 
of the scours and deaths. Because the testimony shows that the LOL replacer could be the only 
possible cause of the scours and deaths, the testimony also ruled out any other reasonably likely 
causes. Therefore, Mr. Hurtado' s testimony describing the change from LOL replacer to 
government replacer, and subsequent resolution of his problems, met the Respondent's burden 
of proof to put on evidence to rule out other reasonably likely causes of the calf deaths. 
B) THE JURY VERDICT WAS SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL AND COMPETENT 
EVIDENCE 
1) The Jury's Finding of a Product Defect/Breach of Warranty of Merchantability Should Not 
be Disturbed because it was Based on Substantial, Competent, Although Conflicting, Evidence. 
"Issues of fact are questions for the jury, and the jury's verdict on such matters will not, 
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in most instances, be disturbed on appeal." Boe! v. Stewart Title Guar. Co., 137 Idaho 9, 12 
(2002) ( citing Garrett Freightlines, Inc. v. Bannock Paving Co., 112 Idaho 722, 726 (1987)). 
An appellate court may only set aside the jury's findings when they are "clearly erroneous." 
See, Smith v. Mitton, 140 Idaho 893, 900 (2004) (citing McCray v. Rosenkrance, 135 Idaho 509, 
513 (2001)). The jury's findings are clearly erroneous only if they are not supported by 
"substantial and competent" evidence. See, id "Findings based on substantial, competent 
evidence, although conflicting, will not be disturbed on appeal." Id 
Whether evidence is substantial is neither a question of volume, nor a question of 
comparison by an appellate court's weighing of one party's evidence against the others. Rather, 
evidence is substantial so long as a reasonable person would accept and rely on it. Id In fact, 
any weighing of evidence or questioning of credibility by the appellate court is strictly 
forbidden. Toews v. Funk, 129 Idaho 316, 319 (Ct. App. 1994). In sum, only if the Court 
concludes that reasonable minds could not differ, should it set aside the jury verdict. Boe!, 
supra. 
The evidence presented to the jury below was indeed conflicting. The jury heard from 
the Plaintiff that he began feeding the LOL milk replacer to his heifers, but not his bulls living 
under otherwise identical conditions, and that the heifers, but not the bulls, began to experience 
an increased rate of scours and death. Tr. 32-33. Furthermore, the Plaintiff testified that he 
switched the heifers from LOL to "government" replacer, and the heifers stopped suffering 
scours and death. Tr. 34 
The jury also heard from fact and expert witnesses for the defendant. Mr. Macfarland, 
of Valley Co-Ops, testified that he re-sold the excess LOL replacer to other ranches in the area, 
and those ranches never complained about the LOL replacer. Tr. 319-20. Mr. Karstens, the 
Director of Operations and Quality Assurance for LOL testified to the quality control 
mechanisms in place to attempt to ensure that LOL replacer is healthy. Tr. 515-32. Mr. 
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Zadnicheck, the production manager at the LOL milk replacer plant, testified that the replacer 
fed by the Plaintiff must have come from one or more of four lots. Tr. 343-52. Mr. Riesberg, a 
chemist for LOL, testified that of those four lots, samples were tested out of three of those lots, 
and found by LOL to be suitable for consumption. Tr. 393-415. 
Clearly, the Plaintiff put on evidence tending to show that the LOL replacer was 
defective, and the Defendant put on evidence to suggest that it would be unlikely that the LOL 
replacer was defective. Although the evidence in this case is conflicting, the evidence put on by 
the Plaintiff was substantial, and therefore the jury's findings should be upheld. The Plaintiff's 
testimony was equivalent to the best of scientific experiments. When experimenting to 
determine causation, one strives to eliminate all variables but the one being tested. If one can 
run two tests where all but one variable remains constant, and the results are different for the 
two tests, than one can be assured that the difference resulted from the variable. Such a test is 
exactly what Mr. Hurtado testified to conducting. He was feeding the LOL replacer and his 
heifers were dying. He changed only the replacer, and his heifers no longer died. It is certainly 
reasonable for the jury in this case to have concluded, based on this purest of scientific 
experiments, and even in the face of evidence suggesting that a fault with the LOL replacer was 
unlikely, that the LOL replacer was defective. Therefore, the jury's finding of a product 
defect/breach of the implied warranty of merchantability was based on substantial evidence, and 
should not be overturned on appeal. 
2) The Jury's Finding of Damages in the Amount of$50,000 Should Not be Disturbed because 
it was Based on Substantial, Competent, Although Conflicting, Evidence. 
The Appellants' challenge to the sufficiency of evidence concerning damages is two-
fold: The Appellants argue that the Respondent did not meet its burden of proof to show 
evidence of fair market value. The Appellants also argue that the finding by the jury of 
damages in the amount of $50,000.00 was not supported by substantial evidence. 
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a) The Respondent Met its Burden of Proo/to Present Evidence of Fair Market Value 
As stated above, a jury's findings of fact (including damages) should not be set aside 
unless they are not supported by substantial, competent evidence. The Appellants do argue that 
no evidence was presented by the respondent to show fair market value of a heifer calf. The 
Respondent agrees that the proper measure of damages is fair market value; however, the 
transcript of the trial clearly shows that the Respondent did put on evidence of the fair market 
value of a heifer calf. 
'"It is settled rule in Idaho that the owner of property is a competent witness to its value, 
as he is presumed to be familiar with its value by reason of inquiries, comparisons, purchases 
and sales."' Howes v. Curtis, 104 Idaho 563, 568 (1983) (quoting Weaver v. Village of 
Bancroft, 92 Idaho 189, 193 (1968)) (emphasis added). The Appellants argue that Mr. Hurtado 
could not testify to his estimate of the value of a heifer calf without providing some basis to 
show that his estimate was linked to the market in heifer calves. However, the rule in Idaho is 
"settled:" the law "presume[s]" that the owner of property has inquired into sales and purchases. 
Mr. Hurtado, as the owner of the destroyed property, was not required to provide any 
background concerning the basis for his value estimate. Mr. Hurtado was asked if his opinion 
of what it would cost to buy replacement calves on the open market was that it would cost 
$10007 He replied, "Yes." Tr. 145. Therefore, the Respondent did properly meet its burden to 
put on evidence of fair market value. 
b) The Jury's Determination of Damages in the Amount o/$50,000 was Supported by 
Substantial, Although Conflicting, Evidence. 
Substantial, though conflicting, evidence was presented by both parties on the market 
value of a heifer calf. Mr. Hurtado's estimate, which is presumed by law to be based on 
experience buying and selling on the market, was certainly reasonable for the jury to rely on. 
The Appellants also put on reasonably reliable evidence of market value to contradict Mr. 
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Hurtado's evidence: a veterinarian testified that a heifer calf was only worth $250, Tr. 483, and 
the Appellants also revealed Mr. Hurtado's deposition testimony that a calf was worth $550. 
Tr. 173. Reasonable minds could certainly differ on which of the three estimates to believe, and 
therefore, there was substantial evidence on the question of value per calf. 
Substantial, although conflicting, evidence was also presented as to the number of calves 
that died. Mr. Hurtado testified from memory that 130 heifers died due to the LOL replacer. 
Tr. 146-4 7. Other testimony, from workers at the ranch, remembered higher death rates: "1 Oto 
12" per day for two weeks and then more for the rest of a month, Tr. 230; and "half' of "900." 
Tr. 242. It is certainly reasonable for a jury to "accept and rely on" the memory of the owner of 
destroyed property. It would also be reasonable for a jury to rely on the memory of those who 
worked with the property on a daily basis. Therefore, although the testimony was conflicting, it 
was also substantial, and therefore, the jury was free to rely on it in determining the number of 
calves that died, and their determination should not be disturbed on appeal. 
One can only speculate as to the basis of the jury's final calculation of damages. 
However, because substantial, although conflicting, evidence was presented on the two factors 
relevant to the final damages amount (market value of one calf and the total number of calves 
lost due to the LOL replacer), the jury's determination of evidence should be upheld. 
Finally, because the jury's determinations of breach of the warranty of merchantability 
and damages were both supported by substantial, competent evidence, the lower court ruled 
correctly when it denied the Appellants a directed verdict and judgment NOV. See, Carlson v. 
Stanger, 146 Idaho 642, 645-46 (Ct. App. 2008). 
C) BECAUSE MR. BRUDEVOLD WAS PROPERLY QUALIFIED AS A NUTRITIONIST, HIS 
OPINIONS CONCERNING POTENTIAL PROBLEMS WITH THE LOL REPLACER WERE 
PROPERLY ADMITTED 
"Decisions regarding the inclusion or exclusion of evidence are within the sound 
discretion of the trial court and will not be upset on appeal absent a showing that the trial court 
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abused its discretion." Fish Breeders of Idaho, Inc. v. Langdon, Inc., 108 Idaho 379,382 
(1985). 
Idaho Rule of Evidence § 702 requires that a witness be qualified by "knowledge, skill, 
experience, training, or education" in order to testify as an expert witness. The same rule also 
requires that the testimony only be admitted if the "[ s Jcientific, technical, or other specialized 
knowledge will assist the trier of fact .... " Therefore, in order to lay a proper foundation to 
qualify a witness as an expert, the witness must testify to his special experience, knowledge, or 
skill that makes his testimony more helpful to the jury then their own common knowledge and 
experience. Idaho Dept. of Health and Welfare v. Doe, 149 Idaho 474,477 (2010). 
Mr. Brudevold's foundational testimony can be summarized as follows: he is a 
professional ruminant nutritionist, Tr. 59; he works with dairies to determine ifthere are any 
nutritional problems, Tr. 59-60; he also has some on-the-job training in the manufacture of milk 
replacers, Tr. 61-62; he has dealt with scours in the past and has a normal routine to try and 
determine if the scours are nutritionally caused. Tr. 64-65. Mr. Brudevold's expert opinions 
can be summarized as follows: because there were no bacteria in the scour samples, the scours 
were likely nutritionally caused, Tr. 65-69; that excessive heat during the drying process can 
lead to destruction and non-digestibility of milk replacer proteins (i.e., scours). Tr. 122-25. 
The Appellants argue that Mr. Brudevold needed to conduct testing of the LOL replacer 
in order to give an expert opinion that it was excessively heated. However, Mr. Brudevold did 
not testify that the LOL feed was excessively heated; only that excessive heating can cause 
replacer to be un-digestible, resulting in scours and death. He left it to the jury to draw 
whatever conclusions they wished from that knowledge. Mr. Brudevold was certainly qualified 
to provide this knowledge, as he had training in milk replacer production. 
The Appellants also argue that Mr. Brudevold was not qualified to give an opinion that 
the scours experienced by the Respondent were nutritionally caused. However, Mr. 
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Brudevold's specialized knowledge in ruminant nutrition and specialized experience in 
determining if scours are nutritionally caused certainly qualified him to opine that the scours in 
this case were likely nutritionally caused. 
Furthermore, a verdict will not be overturned on appeal, nor a new trial granted based on 
a faulty evidentiary ruling, if the error is harmless. See, Gonzales v. Hodson, 91 Idaho 330, 333 
( 1966). As has already been argued, the jury's verdict can be sustained merely on the 
substantial and competent evidence provided by Mr. Hurtado's testimony. Specifically, Mr. 
Hurtado's testimony that his heifers were experiencing higher than normal death rates when 
consuming the LOL replacer, that Mr. Hurtado changed only the replacer, and then death rates 
dropped back to normal. Therefore, any error in allowing the expert testimony of Mr. 
Brudevold is harmless, and the jury's verdict should be upheld. 
D) THE LOWER COURT CORRECTLY PERlvfITTED lvJR. BRUDEVOLD TO PROVIDE 
FACTUAL TES11MONY CONCERNING SIMILAR CALF DEATHS ON HIS OWN RANCH 
The Appellants argue that all of Mr. Brudevold's testimony was "expert" testimony, and 
therefore required the laying of a proper foundation concerning his expert qualifications. 
However, much of Mr. Brudevold's testimony was given merely as a fact witness. The factual 
testimony that the Appellants now complain of was Mr. Brudevold's testimony that, at about 
the same time that the Respondent was experiencing scours and feeding LOL replacer, Mr. 
Brudevold was also feeding LOL replacer and experiencing scours. Tr. 70-72. Mr. Brudevold 
further testified that when he switched to the government replacer, his calves' scours resolved. 
Tr. 73. Mr. Brudevold also testified that he later tried feeding the LOL replacer again, those 
calves immediately got scours, and so he completely stopped using LOL replacer. Tr. 74. 
The Appellants argue that the above testimony was offered as an example of similar 
problems with the same product, in order to bolster the claim of product defect. The Appellants 
further argue that no foundation was laid to show that the problems experienced by Mr. 
Respondents' Brief-13-
Brudevold were "substantially similar" to those experienced by the Respondent, as required by 
Idaho case-law. See, Fish Breeders of Idaho, Inc. v. Langdon, Inc., 108 Idaho 379,382 (1985). 
The Appellants contend that the Respondent needed to show that the LOL replacer fed by Mr. 
Brudevold was from the same lot as that fed by the Respondent. 
No Idaho case has ever held that, in order to put on evidence of similar problems from a 
substance, a plaintiff must show that in both cases the substance came from the same lot. This 
is not surprising, as appellate courts tend to defer to the "sound discretion" of the trial court to 
decide on a case-by-case basis whether the situations were "substantially similar." See, e.g., id. 
The trial court in this case considered extensive argument on the admissibility of Mr. 
Brudevold's fact testimony. The trial court carefully excluded testimony of similar problems 
until after it was content that proper foundation had been laid to show "substantial similarity." 
Therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing the testimony of similar scour 
problems when feeding LOL replacer. See, id. 
Finally, as with Mr. Brudevold's expert testimony, his factual testimony was also 
unnecessary to sustain the jury's verdict, and so any error by the trial court in allowing the 
testimony would be harmless. 
V. ATTORNEYS' FEES ON APPEAL 
Idaho Code Sec. 12-120(3) requires that attorneys' fees be granted to the prevailing 
party, both at the trial level and on appeal, when the action is to recover in a "commercial 
transaction." See, Walker v. American Cyanamid Co., 130 Idaho 824, 834 (1997) (citing Bott v. 
Idaho State Bldg. Auth., 122 Idaho 471,481 (1992)). Attorneys' fees under 12-120(3) are only 
appropriate where "the commercial transaction is integral to the claim, and constitutes the basis 
upon which the party is attempting to recover." Id. This Court has previously ruled that 12-
120(3) does command a grant of attorneys' fees when the suit is a products liability case based 
on an express warranty. Id. at 826, 34. The reasoning provided by this Court was that the 
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warranty is "part of' the transaction. Id at 834. Although this Court has yet to rule similarly in 
a case like this one, involving an implied warranty, the result should be the same. Implied 
warranties are every bit a "part of' a transaction as express warranties. Therefore, Idaho Code 
Sec. 12-120(3) requires a grant of attorneys' fees to the prevailing party in this case, which is 
based on the implied warranty of merchantability. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The Appellants spend most of their brief attempting to show that the evidence in support 
of their defense was somehow better than the evidence put on by the Respondent. The 
Respondent does not deny that the Appellants put on substantial, competent evidence. 
However, the fact that a defendant puts on evidence that could lead a reasonable trier of fact to 
find in its favor does not mean that a reasonable trier of fact could have only found in the 
defendant's favor. 
In this case, the Respondent also put on substantial competent evidence. Particularly, 
Mr. Hurtado testified to the fact that when he was feeding LOL replacer to heifers, they were 
experiencing scours and resultant death at a higher rate then normal; when he switched the feed 
to government replacer, the heifers experienced only normal rates of death. This testimony not 
only was evidence excluding all reasonable potential causes of death other than the LOL 
replacer, but was also evidence reasonably allowing the jury to conclude that the LOL replacer 
was defective. Furthermore, Mr. Hurtado testified to his memory of how many calves died, and 
his estimate of the market value of a calf, providing the jury with substantial, competent 
evidence of damages. 
Finally, although not necessary to sustain the jury's verdict, Judge Stoker allowed Mr. 
Brudevold to testify that his calves consuming the LOL replacer experienced scours at 
approximately the same time as J and J calves, and further testify that it was his opinion that the 
scours in the J and J calves were "nutritional" scours. The factual testimony of Mr. Brudevold's 
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own experience was properly allowed only after Judge Stoker ensured that a proper foundation 
was laid to show true similarity between Mr. Brudevold's experience with the LOL replacer and 
Mr. Hurtado's experience with the LOL replacer. The expert testimony was only allowed after 
Judge Stoker ensured that proper foundational testimony of Mr. Brudevold's special knowledge 
was elicited. Therefore, although any error in allowing Mr. Brudevold's testimony would be 
harmless, Judge Stoker in fact exercised his discretion appropriately when he allowed the 
testimony. 
Because Judge Stoker did not abuse his discretion in allowing Mr. Brudevold's factual 
and expert testimony, and because any error he may have committed was harmless, and because 
the Respondent put on evidence to meet all of his burdens of proof, and further because the 
evidence put on by the Respondent was substantial and competent, the jury's verdict in favor of 
the Respondent should be upheld. 
Respectfully submitted this day of August, 2011 
Law Office of Harry DeHaan 
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